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COMPRESSING TESTAMENTARY INTENT INTO INTER
VIVOS DELIVERY: WHAT MAKES A CONVEYANCE EFFEC-
TIVE?-In re Estate of O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 749 P.2d 154
(1988).
Abstract In In re Estate of O'Brien, the Supreme Court of Washington held that intent
to pass a deed title at death fulfills the inter vivos delivery requirement and that the will
substitute statute removes ineffective conveyances from the will statute requirement. This
Note concludes that the O'Brien interpretations of delivery and the will substitute statute
are misguided, and recommends judicial reversal of the delivery ruling and a legislative
rewording of the statute.
Ms. Ross dies without a will. The only papers she leaves behind are
two undelivered deeds purporting to pass title at her death. Does her
estate fall into intestacy?-possibly not, as a result of the Supreme
Court of Washington's holding in In re Estate of O'Brien. I The
O'Brien court considered a case in which two deeds apparently passed
all interest at the grantor's death. It held that intent to pass title at
death, absent compliance with the legal delivery requirement,2 effec-
tively transfered property. With that decision, the majority diverged
from traditional property law, which states that both present intent
and delivery are necessary for an effective inter vivos conveyance.
Further, despite contrary interpretations from commentators and
other jurisdictions, the court held that the Washington "will substitute
statute"3 validated such undelivered, ineffective transfers, in spite of
their noncompliance with the Washington "will statute."'4 This may
have rendered the Washington will statute obsolete and thrown Wash-
ington property law into confusion.
I. REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF PROPERTY TRANSFERS
A. The O'Brien Dispute
The In re Estate of O'Brien I issues were whether two deeds effec-
tively conveyed property, even though titles did not pass until the
grantor's death, and whether Washington's will substitute statute6
exempted those deeds from the statutory requirements relating to the
execution of wills. In 1979, Mary O'Brien executed two deeds to her
1. 109 Wash. 2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988).
2. Id. at 919, 749 P.2d at 158.
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.090 (1987).
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (1987).
5. 109 Wash. 2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988).
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.090 (1987).
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daughter, Peaches Robinson.7 The unrecorded deeds were kept in a
joint safe deposit box until 1982, when the women closed the box and
Robinson took physical possession of the deeds.8 O'Brien, however,
continued to pay for utilities, insurance, repairs, and all maintenance
on both properties. She also paid all property taxes and swore to the
City of Seattle that she was the fee owner of one of the properties.9
O'Brien lived on one property and her daughter moved onto the other
and paid rent to her mother. Following O'Brien's stroke in 1983,
Robinson recorded the deeds.' ° Her mother died intestate, without
regaining consciousness. The court appointed one of O'Brien's grand-
daughters as personal representative, and she filed an action to quiet
title to the properties. Robinson counterclaimed that her mother had
transfered the properties to her. 1
Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals found the evidence
clear, cogent, and convincing 2 that the deeds failed as inter vivos con-
veyances because O'Brien had not legally delivered them to Robin-
son. 1 3 The court also rejected Robinson's claim that the will substitute
statute 14 validated the transfers, finding that the statute only pertained
to effective conveyances, not to undelivered deeds.' 5
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed, holding that the will
substitute statute did apply, 6 despite the deeds' apparent testamentary
nature. Although Robinson did not appeal the delivery issue, 7 the
court held that the legal delivery requirement is satisfied when a gran-
tor intends to pass title at death.' 8
7. In re Estate of O'Brien, 46 Wash. App. 860, 861, 733 P.2d 235, 236 (1987), rev'd, 109
Wash. 2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988).
8. At trial, some witnesses testified that Robinson did not physically possess the deeds until
much later. O'Brien, 46 Wash. App. at 862, 733 P.2d at 236.
9. Id. This enabled her to qualify for a senior citizen tax discount on the property.
10. Id. at 862, 733 P.2d at 236.
11. Id. At trial, witnesses presented sharply conflicting testimony as to O'Brien's intent
concerning the disposition of her property. Some witnesses indicated she wanted to give the
property to her grandchildren, others testified she wanted to sell the holdings, and still others
claimed O'Brien wanted Robinson to get the land. Id. at 863, 733 P.2d at 237.
12. Id. at 865, 733 P.2d at 238.
13. Id. at 864-65, 733 P.2d at 237-38.
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.090 (1987).
15. In re Estate of O'Brien, 46 Wash. App. 860, 866-67, 733 P.2d 235, 238-39 (1987), rev'd,
109 Wash. 2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988).
16. In re Estate of O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 919, 749 P.2d 154, 158 (1988).
17. Id. at 916, 749 P.2d at 156.
18. Id. at 919, 749 P.2d at 158.
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What Makes a Conveyance Effective?
B. Property Transfer Requirements
Analysis of O'Brien requires examining the traditional requirements
of property transfers, and distinguishing between testamentary and
inter vivos transactions. 19 In a testamentary transfer, all interest in
the property passes at the grantor's death.20 Such transfers must con-
form to the requirements of the will statute21 to be effective.22 Gener-
ally, more formal requirements apply to wills than to inter vivos
transfers. 23 A critical distinction between testamentary and inter vivos
gifts is that the testamentary transferee receives no property rights
until the transferor's death.24
In inter vivos transfers, grantors relinquish absolute ownership of
the property during their lifetime and deliver some property interest to
the grantee.25 Under long-established principles of property law, valid
inter vivos gifts require both present intent and delivery.26 A variety
of factors determine intent,27 and delivery can be explicit or implied.28
Will substitutes are methods of inter vivos conveyances which none-
theless produce results similar to testamentary transfers. 29 The gran-
tor makes a present delivery of a future interest to the grantee. 30 Will
19. For further explanation of the differences between forms of property transfers, see 5A G.
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 2603, at 287-88
(1978 & Supp. 1981); 6 id. §§ 2935-36 (1962); 4 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§§ 1033-34 (3d ed. 1975).
20. 5A G. THOMPSON, supra note 19, § 2603, at 287; see also In re Estate of Verbeek, 2
Wash. App. 144, 150-51, 467 P.2d 178, 183 (1970).
21. All wills must be written, signed by the testator, and witnessed by at least two competent
witnesses. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (1987).
22. 5A G. THOMPSON, supra note 19, § 2603. A will statute serves three purposes. First,
compliance with the ritualistic aspects of a will helps the testator evidence deliberate intent.
Second, the evidentiary characteristics of a will increase the reliability of proof in a probate
dispute. Third, the formality required by the will statute serves the prophylactic purpose of
protecting the testator from undue influence. Gulliver & Tilson, Classfication of Gratuitous
Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 2-5 (1941).
23. Browder, Giving or Leaving-What Is a Will?, 75 MICH. L. REv. 845, 847 (1977).
24. 5A G. THOMPSON, supra note 19, § 2603, at 290; cf Verbeek, 2 Wash. App. at 150, 467
P.2d at 183.
25. In re Estate of Verbeek, 2 Wash. App. 144, 150, 467 P.2d 178, 183 (1970).
26. 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 19, § 1033, at 359.
27. Verbeek, 2 Wash. App. at 149-50, 467 P.2d at 182-83; see also Annotation, Sufficiency of
Delivery of Deed Where Grantor Retains or Recovers Physical Possession, 87 A.L.R.2d 787, 796
(1963).
28. 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 19, § 1034. With implied delivery, no physical transfer of the
deed and property from grantor to grantee is needed.
29. Browder, supra note 23, at 845.
30. Will substitutes may include life insurance policies, joint tenancies, pension benefits,
contracts with payable-on-death provisions, and deeds. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.090 (1987),
U.P.C. § 6-201 (1987); Browder, supra note 23. For examples of successful will substitute
conveyances, see In re Cunningham's Estate, 19 Wash. 2d 589, 143 P.2d 852 (1943) (valid gift
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substitutes can be nontestamentary3" and effective as inter vivos trans-
fers when the "merest fragment of property interest passes to someone
else."32 For instance, a grantor may reserve the right to retain a life
estate in property conveyed to a grantee.33 The theory behind will
substitutes is that the grantor has legally delivered the property and
has only delayed the grantee's enjoyment of it.34
When a deed contains a dispositive provision that takes effect at
death, the key question becomes whether it is an inter vivos will substi-
tute or a testamentary transfer.35 If the transfer is inter vivos, the
grantor must have the requisite intent and relinquish some interest in
the property to the grantee.36 If these two requirements are met, the
transfer is an inter vivos will substitute.37 If a deed transfers no inter-
est until the grantor's death, however, it is a testamentary transfer and
must be included in a valid will to be effective.38
where donor, who retained use, management, and control of property, irrevocably parted with
deed by giving deed to third party for delivery to donee at donor's death); Riley v. Riley, 266
S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1954) (effective deed stating fee simple was to vest in grantees at grantor's
death); St. Louis County Nat'l Bank v. Fielder, 364 Mo. 207, 260 S.W.2d 483 (1953) (valid deed
conveying property to grantee but reserving life estate for grantor); Kerns v. Kerns, 157 Neb.
786, 61 N.W.2d 405 (1953) (valid delivery although grantee's use of property postponed until
grantor's death). See also 8 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 4226, at 13-16 (1963).
31. See 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 6.1 (1960).
32. Browder, supra note 23, at 851; see also Comment, Contracts To Devise Real Property, 14
WASH. L. REV. 30, 35 (1939).
33. 5A G. THOMPSON, supra note 19, § 2603, at 304-05; see, e.g., In re Estate of Verbeek, 2
Wash. App. 144, 150, 467 P.2d 178, 183 (1970).
34. Browder, supra note 23, at 860.
35. See 8 G. THOMPSON, supra note 30, § 4226, at 13; Browder, supra note 23, at 849.
Conventional property law distinguishes between the present conveyance of a future interest and
an invalid testamentary disposition. 8 G. THOMPSON, supra note 30, § 4226, at 17. For example,
a deed giving ownership of the family home to a son, but reserving a father's right to live in the
house until death, conveys a future interest to the son and is an effective inter vivos conveyance
by will substitute. In re Estate of Pappuleas, 5 Wash. App. 826, 490 P.2d 1340 (1971).
Alternatively, a deed from uncle to nephew, transfering title at the uncle's death, is an invalid
inter vivos conveyance, even if the nephew farms and pays taxes on the land. First Nat'l Bank v.
Bloom, 264 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1978); see 5A G. THOMPSON, supra note 19, § 2603, at 295-96;
cf. Verbeek 2 Wash. App. at 150-51, 467 P.2d at 183.
36. 8 G. THOMPSON, supra note 30, § 4226, at 13; Browder, supra note 23, at 845-54.
37. Verbeek 2 Wash. App. at 153, 467 P.2d at 184-85 (if a future interest is passed, it is not a
testamentary instrument); Browder, supra note 23, at 854-77.
38. Juel v. Doll, 51 Wash. 2d 435, 319 P.2d 543 (1957) (where grantor does not intend to pass
present interest at time deed is executed, there is no valid delivery); Holohan v. Melville, 41
Wash. 2d 380, 249 P.2d 777 (1952); In re Murphy's Estate, 193 Wash. 400, 75 P.2d 916 (1938);
In re Estate of Verbeek, 2 Wash. App. 144, 467 P.2d 178 (1970); 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER,
supra note 31, § 6.1, at 218.
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C. Manifestations of Intent and Delivery
Case by case judicial determinations of whether a conveyance is
inter vivos or testamentary produce widely varying results.39 The fact
specific nature of each case with regard to questions of intent and
delivery produces results peculiar to the conveyance in question.
40
Although the two elements are related,4 ' they are distinguishable.42
While intent plays a role in delivery,43 without delivery of an interest,
an effective inter vivos conveyance cannot exist.4
4
A grantor can manifest intent to convey an interest through a will
substitute in many ways.45 In finding intent, courts consider the
deed's nature, form, and physical location; the parties' conduct and
relationship; the grantor's power of revocation or sale; the grantee's
access to the deed; and recordation. 46 A physical transfer of some tan-
gible item is unnecessary to show intent, but it may be persuasive.4
The grantor's language, both written and spoken, also indicates
intent.48  Relinquishing control of the property to a third party
39. Some commentators liken the classification quandary to a shell game. "Now you see the
'interest'; now you don't; sometimes it seems to be here, sometimes there." Gulliver & Tilson,
supra note 22, at 37.
40. Anderson v. Ruberg, 20 Wash. 2d 103, 107-08, 145 P.2d 890, 893 (1944) (each case must
be decided on its own facts and provides negligible assistance in deciding another case); see also
Annotation, Effect on Validity and Character of Instrument in Form of Deed of Provisions
Therein Indicating an Intention to Postpone or Limit the Rights of Grantee Until After the Death
of Grantor, 31 A.L.R.2d 532 (1953).
41. E.g., Juel v. Doll, 51 Wash. 2d 435, 319 P.2d 543 (1957) (valid delivery may depend on
whether grantor intended deed should presently pass title); Bull v. Fenich, 34 Wash. App. 435,
440, 661 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1983) ("Delivery, one of the basic requirements for an effective
conveyance, requires an intent to make a deed presently operable.").
42. See 6 G. THOMPSON, supra note 19, § 2936.
43. Eg., Raborn v. Hayton, 34 Wash. 2d 105, 109, 208 P.2d 133, 136 (1949) (delivery
requires grantor's intent that the conveyance should presently take effect (citing Anderson v.
Ruberg, 20 Wash. 2d 103, 145 P.2d 890 (1944))); see also Malek v. Patten, 208 Mont. 237, 678
P.2d 201 (1984) (intestate decedent showed present intent to establish and convey a valid joint
tenancy with her husband by purchasing certificates of deposit and opening a checking account,
payable to decedent or husband, even though husband was unaware a joint tenancy existed until
after wife's death); 4 H. TiFFANY supra note 19, § 1034, at 361.
44. Eg., Bull v. Fenich, 34 Wash. App. 435, 661 P.2d 1012 (1983) (ineffective present
delivery because deed was conditional upon the grantee's mother predeceasing the grantor); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bloom, 264 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1978) (ineffective delivery where grantor kept deed
in his safety deposit box, paid all taxes on the land, and made statements indicating that at death
he wanted the property to go to the grantee).
45. 5A G. THOMPSON, supra note 19, § 2603, at 294-95.
46. In re Estate of Verbeek, 2 Wash. App. 144, 149-50, 467 P.2d 178, 182-83 (1970);
Annotation, supra note 27, at 792.
47. Browder, supra note 23, at 861; see also Johnson v. Brown, 65 Idaho 359, 144 P.2d 198
(1943) (physical transfer is unnecessary as long as intent and delivery are shown).
48. See, eg., In re Kirkpatrick's Estate, 140 Wash. 452, 249 P. 980 (1926). In Kirkpatrick
the court found present intent to deliver a future interest when the grantor sent a letter to his
483
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provides a rebuttable presumption of the grantor's intent to deliver a
present interest.49
In addition to requiring a manifestation of the grantor's intent, an
effective transfer requires delivery of a present50 or future51 interest
during the grantor's lifetime. 52 While physical possession of the deed
by the grantee raises a strong presumption of delivery,5 3 that presump-
tion is rebuttable by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the
grantor retained absolute ownership14 or actual possession of the prop-
erty." Recordation will not validate a deed,5 6 but it does create
another rebuttable presumption of delivery.5 7  This presumption is
much stronger when it is the grantor who records the deed.58
Conventional property law requires present intent and delivery of
some interest to the grantee in all inter vivos transactions. In addition
to deciding whether the O'Brien deeds met these requirements, the
sister stating that he had placed all of his property, which she was to receive upon his death, in
escrow. The court also found intent in the man's remarks reminding his attorney of the escrow
agreement and reiterating that he wanted his sister to have his property. See also Raborn v.
Hayton, 34 Wash. 2d 105, 208 P.2d 133 (1949) (no intent to deliver when a woman executing a
deed in her attorney's office commented that she would deliver the deed only upon receipt of a
property settlement from her estranged husband).
49. Maxwell v. Harper, 51 Wash. 351, 98 P. 756 (1909) (grantor deposited deed in bank,
relinquishing all control over property, but reserving the right to keep the profits from the land
during his lifetime).
50. See generally, supra text accompanying notes 25-28 (detailing standard inter vivos
transfers).
51. 8 G. THOMPSON, supra note 30, § 4226, at 16; see also In re Murphy's Estate, 193 Wash.
400, 407-08, 75 P.2d 916, 919 (1938). In Murphy's Estate, a lease provided that by meeting
certain conditions, the YMCA could lease property for the duration of the lessor's life. If these
conditions were not met, the lessor reserved the right to reenter and retake the property. If the
lease was still in effect at the lessor's death, the YMCA would become outright owner of the
property. At the lessor's death, the court held that the lease was an invalid testamentary
disposition. Because the lessor had retained all control over the property until his death, there
was no valid inter vivos transfer of any interest.
52. 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 19, § 1033, at 359. If the deed is not delivered during the
grantor's lifetime, the deed is ineffective and the transaction is testamentary. Murphy's Estate,
193 Wash. at 407-08, 75 P.2d at 919; In re Estate of Verbeek, 2 Wash. App. 144, 150, 467 P.2d
178, 183 (1970); Browder, supra note 23, at 861.
53. In re Estate of Pappuleas, 5 Wash. App. 826, 828, 490 P.2d 1340, 1341 (1971) (citing
Raborn v. Hayton, 34 Wash. 2d 105, 208 P.2d 133 (1949)).
54. 8 G. THOMPSON, supra note 30, § 4238, at 93-94; 4 H. TIFFANY, supra note 19, § 1034, at
361-62.
55. In re Estate of O'Brien, 46 Wash. App. 860, 864, 733 P.2d 235, 237 (1987) (citing Raborn
v. Hayton, 34 Wash. 2d 105, 208 P.2d 133 (1949); Pappuleas, 5 Wash. App. at 828, 490 P.2d at
1341), rey'd, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988).
56. 6 G. THOMPSON, supra note 19, § 2935, at 4.
57. 8 G. THOMPSON, supra note 30, § 4240, at 107-08.
58. See Johnson v. Wheeler, 41 Wash. 2d 246, 247, 248 P.2d 558, 560 (1952).
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court also examined whether Washington's will substitute statute59
applied to them.
D. Washington's Will Substitute Statute
The will substitute statute, section 11.02.090 of the Washington
Revised Code, recognizes the nontestamentary nature of will substi-
tutes. It prevents invalidation of will substitutes when they have not
complied with will statute formalities." The subsection of the statute
pertinent to O'Brien reads:
(1) Any of the following provisions in an insurance policy, contract
of employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, deposit agreement,
pension plan, joint tenancy, community property agreement, trust agree-
ment, conveyance, or any other written instrument effective as a con-
tract, gift, conveyance, or trust is deemed to be nontestamentary, and
this title does not invalidate the instrument or any provision:
(c) that any property which is the subject of the instrument shall pass
to a person designated by the decedent in either the instrument or a
separate writing, including a will, executed at the same time as the
instrument or subsequently.
6 1
This statute is based on Uniform Probate Code ("U.P.C.") section
6-201.62 Fourteen other states currently have provisions based on the
U.P.C. section.63 Unlike the U.P.C., Washington's statute adds joint
tenancies and community property agreements to the list of acceptable
conveyance forms.64 Otherwise, the wording in the two provisions is
identical.
59. In re Estate of O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 916, 749 P.2d 154, 156 (1988).
60. Wills must be written, signed by the testator, and witnessed by at least two competent
witnesses. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (1987).
61. WAsH. REv. CODE § 11.02.090 (1987). The two omitted subsections concern money or
other benefits owed the decedent and money due under the instrument. Two additional sections
in the will substitute statute also are not pertinent-one concerns creditors' rights, the other
involves safety deposit repositories.
62. U.P.C. § 6-201 was published in 1969; Washington Revised Code § 11.02.090 was
enacted in 1974.
63. ALASKA STAT. § 13.31.070 (1985); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-6201 (1975); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-15-201 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 15-6-201 (1979); IND. CODE § 32-4-1.5-14
(1980); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.360 (Baldwin 1969); Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.231 (1988);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-1-110 (1987); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2714 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-6-201 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-31-14 (1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-201 (Law.
Co-op. 1976); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 450 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-6-
201 (1978).
64. Washington's statute also adds a provision concerning safety deposit boxes. See supra
note 61.
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Although the legislative history of the Washington statute is lim-
ited,65 the comment following U.P.C. section 6-20 166 can shed light on
the legislative reasoning behind the state statute. The comment indi-
cates that the section's purpose is to give effect to those transfers, usu-
ally of future interests, that would be valid except for the will statute.67
Several commentators have indicated that the U.P.C. and Washing-
ton's similar statute are not designed to validate otherwise ineffective
transfers.6 s However, the majority in O'Brien found otherwise.6 9
E. The O'Brien Decision and Reasoning
Writing for the seven-member majority in O'Brien, Justice
Brachtenbach held that the will substitute statute removed O'Brien's
conveyances from the will statute requirements 70 and validated the
deeds as nontestamentary transfers. 71 The court reasoned that every
word or portion in the statute must be given meaning.72 It rejected the
lower courts' holding that the phrase "effective as" applied to each of
the preceding categories of will substitutes,7 3 so that a property trans-
fer must be already "effective as a conveyance" before the statute
applies. 74 The Supreme Court of Washington called this interpreta-
tion "meaningless, ' 75 and held that the statute "cannot operate upon a
conveyance which is effective as a conveyance because its operation as
a conveyance would in and of itself make it nontestamentary. '"76
The supreme court determined that there are twelve separate cate-
gories of conveyances to which the statute applies;77 the first eleven are
65. Note, Property-Probate Law & Procedure-No More Probate?, 51 WASH. L. REv. 451,
453 (1976).
66. U.P.C. § 6-201 comment (1987).
67. Id. (the sole purpose of the section is to eliminate testamentary characterization of
transfers included in the terms of the section); M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, WASHINGTON
LAW OF WILLS AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION 350-52 (1985).
68. M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, supra note 67, at 351 (the statute does not itself validate
an otherwise ineffective agreement); cf U.P.C. § 6-201 comment (1987).
69. In re Estate of O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 917-18, 749 P.2d 154, 157 (1988).
70. WASH. REv. CODE § 11.12.020 (1987).
71. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 919, 749 P.2d at 158.
72. Id. at 918, 749 P.2d at 157.
73. "Any of the following provisions in an insurance policy, contract of employment, bond,
mortgage, promissory note, deposit agreement, pension plan, joint tenancy, community property
agreement, trust agreement, conveyance or any other written instrument effective as a contract,
gift, conveyance, or trust is deemed to be nontestamentary ..... " WASH. REv. CODE
§ 11.02.090(1) (1987) (emphasis added).
74. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 917, 749 P.2d at 157.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 918, 749 P.2d at 157.
77. Id. at 917, 749 P.2d at 157.
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specifically named."8 Category twelve includes any other written
instruments "effective as a contract, gift, conveyance or trust," not
covered by the first eleven categories.79 This twelfth category, the
court stated, includes ineffective conveyances and makes them nontes-
tamentary.80 Applying this interpretation, the court held that the will
substitute statute validated the O'Brien deeds.81
The parties did not appeal the lower courts' holding that O'Brien
did not intend to pass title until her death. Nevertheless, the supreme
court held that when the proven intent of a grantor is to pass title at
death, the legal delivery requirement of inter vivos transfers is satis-
fied. 2 The "technical, legal" 3 delivery requirement should ensure
that the grantor's intent is realized; in O'Brien's case, requiring strict
compliance with the delivery requirement would "thwart the unchal-
lenged intent of the grantor.184 The court held that O'Brien intended
to pass title at her death,85 and that her intent would suffice for
delivery.
8 6
Justice Dore dissented, relying on conventional property law which
requires both intent and delivery87 to effectuate a valid inter vivos con-
veyance. He found the O'Brien deeds ineffective as inter vivos convey-
ances and therefore ineffective as statutorily defined will substitute
conveyances.88
78. Supra note 61 and accompanying text quoting the relevant statutory language.
79. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 918, 749 P.2d at 157.
80. Id. at 917, 749 P.2d at 157.
81. Id. at 918, 749 P.2d at 157.
82. Id.
83. Id
84. Id at 918-19, 749 P.2d at 157.
85. Id at 918-19, 749 P.2d at 157-58.
86. Id. at 919, 749 P.2d at 158.
87. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (explaining the requirement and indications
of delivery).
88. Justice Dore based the lack of delivery portion of his dissent on the holding in Juel v.
Doll, 51 Wash. 2d 435, 436-37, 319 P.2d 543, 544 (1957) (to constitute delivery it must be clear
that the grantor intended the deed to presently pass title), and on 2 WASHINGTON STATE BAR
ASW'N, REAL PROi'ERTY DESKBOOK §§ 30.11-30.21 (2d ed. 1986) (a valid deed must be
delivered by the grantor to the grantee). Justice Dore combined these sources with the O'Brien
trial court's finding that O'Brien made no present delivery, intending a testamentary transfer.
Justice Dore then cited the comment following U.P.C. section 6-201 and M. REtuTLINGER & W.
OLTMAN, supra note 67, to support the proposition that the will substitute statute cannot




II. FLAWS IN O'BRIEN'S ANALYSIS AND LIMITS UPON
ITS IMPACT
"Mere intention to give is not sufficient to effectuate a gift. " Justice
Blake, Supreme Court of Washington, 1943.89
'TW]hen it is determined that the proved intent of the grantor was to
pass title upon his or her death, the legal requirement of 'delivery' is
satisfied. . . ." Justice Brachtenbach, Supreme Court of Washington,
1988.90
If O'Brien wanted Robinson to have the property, the supreme
court may have reached an equitable solution in O'Brien.9 ' Yet in the
process, the court reformulated property law and policy in this state.
The court apparently eliminated the legal delivery requirement of will
substitutes92 upon a finding that the grantor intended the property to
pass at death.93 Then, diverging from the conventional interpretation
of the will substitute statute,94 the court held that the statute can vali-
date ineffective conveyances. 95 Analysis shows that the orthodox
interpretation of the delivery requirement should be reinstated and
that the conventional scope of the statute is not only valid but also the
one most likely intended by the Washington State Legislature.96
A. The Court's Failure To Distinguish Between Valid Inter Vivos
Delivery and O'Brien's Testamentary Intent
Although neither party appealed the lower courts' determination
that O'Brien intended the titles to pass only at her death, the Supreme
Court of Washington addressed the issue and held that intent to pass
title at death satisfied the legal delivery requirement of an effective
inter vivos conveyance.97 This holding contradicts the established
inter vivos delivery requirement that some property interest pass to
the grantee during the grantor's life.98
89. In re Cunningham's Estate, 19 Wash. 2d 589, 595, 143 P.2d 852, 855 (1943) (Blake, J.,
dissenting in part).
90. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 919, 749 P.2d at 158.
91. See supra note 11 and accompanying text regarding factual disputes at the trial court
level. Some commentators indicate "delivery" may only be a label for results reached on other
grounds. If a court finds donative intent exists, it finds delivery. Conversely, a finding of no
delivery reflects the court's opinion that no delivery was intended. W. McGOVERN, S. KURTZ &
J. REIN, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 184 (1988) (citing Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 22).
92. Supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text (legal delivery requirements).
93. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 919, 749 P.2d at 157.
94. Infra notes 113-43 and accompanying text.
95. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 919, 749 P.2d at 157.
96. M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, supra note 67, at 352.
97. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 918-19, 749 P.2d at 157-58.
98. 8 G. THOMPSON, supra note 30, § 4226, at 13-14.
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The court missed the critical distinction between the intent in con-
veying a will substitute to deliver an inter vivos future interest, and the
intent to deliver an interest only at death.9 9 Passing title at death is
the testamentary function of a will, not of an inter vivos transfer.100
Once the court found that O'Brien intended to convey only at her
death,101 it also should have found that there was no effective convey-
ance. Even if O'Brien intended to give an inter vivos interest in the
deeds, she failed to deliver anything. Conventional indications of
delivery, 10 2 such as the grantor's parting with absolute ownership and
recording the deed, suggest that the O'Brien deeds were not validly
delivered inter vivos and were ineffective conveyances.
The supreme court found that Robinson had physical possession of
the deeds when her mother died, 10 3 yet it was O'Brien who paid all of
the property expenses, swore she was fee owner of one of the proper-
ties, and received rent payments from her daughter."0 Under tradi-
tional property concepts,'05 all of these actions work to rebut the
delivery presumption based on Robinson's physical possession of the
deeds, 10 6 by suggesting that O'Brien retained absolute ownership of
the property until her death. 107 Such absolute ownership indicates an
attempted testamentary transfer, not an effective inter vivos
delivery.108
99. Supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (describing differences between testamentary
and inter vivos transfers).
100. Id
101. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 919, 749 P.2d at 157.
102. Courts can find valid delivery based on a variety of actions taken by the grantor. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Wheeler, 41 Wash. 2d 246, 248 P.2d 558 (1952) (recording of deed by grantor
constitutes rebuttable presumption of delivery); In re Cunningham's Estate, 19 Wash. 2d 589,
143 P.2d 852 (1943) (donor's giving up possession of deed constitutes rebuttable presumption of
delivery); Bloor v. Bloor, 105 Wash. 110, 177 P. 722 (1919) (delivery can be made to third party,
but validity not established if property still in grantor's control and there is no present intent to
pass title); In re Estate of Pappuleas, 5 Wash. App. 826, 490 P.2d 1340 (1971) (grantee's
possession of deed creates a rebuttable presumption of delivery).
103. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 915-16, 749 P.2d at 156.
104. Supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
105. Supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
106. In re Estate of O'Brien, 46 Wash. App. 860, 865, 733 P.2d 235, 238 (1987), rev'd, 109
Wash. 2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988).
107. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bloom, 264 N.W. 208 (N.D. 1978) (when grantor pays
taxes on property, there is no delivery to grantee). But see Severson v. First Baptist Church, 34
Wash. 2d 297, 208 P.2d 616 (1949) (delivery found although donor retained use, management,
control, and taxpaying responsibilities during his life). Severson may be distinguished from
O'Brien because the Severson donor gave up control of the property by telling others his intent to
presently relinquish control and by depositing the deed with a third party.
108. 8 G. THOMPSON, supra note 30, § 4240, at 107-08.
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Mary O'Brien did not record the deeds.10 9 Instead, the grantee
recorded them after her mother lapsed into a coma.110 Any presump-
tion of delivery based upon recordation is severely weakened, if not
eliminated, by a finding that the grantor died unaware that the grantee
recorded the deeds.11
Under conventional property analysis, no effective inter vivos deliv-
ery occurred in O'Brien. Although the grantee had possession of the
deeds and recorded them during the grantor's lifetime, these two deliv-
ery presumptions can be rebutted by O'Brien's retention of absolute
ownership and failure to record the deeds herself. Although the lower
courts so held in unappealed portions of their opinions, 1 2 the
Supreme Court of Washington reversed and held that intent to pass
title at death satisfied the inter vivos legal delivery requirement. Per-
haps the court took this position to bolster its finding that the will
substitute statute, which pertains to nontestamentary conveyances,
applied to the O'Brien deeds.
B. Inapplicability of the Will Substitute Statute to Otherwise
Ineffective Deeds
In holding the will substitute statute applicable to ineffective con-
veyances, the supreme court described the court of appeals' conven-
tional interpretation of the statute as "meaningless." ' 1 3  It is not a
meaningless statute, but neither is it designed to give effect to an inef-
fective conveyance." 4 Washington's will substitute statute is inappli-
cable to the O'Brien deeds. Support for this proposition is found in
evidence of the U.P.C. drafters' intent and expert commentary on both
the U.P.C. and Washington's statute. Further evidence for this statu-
tory interpretation is found in the outcome of cases decided before
states enacted will substitute statutes, other states' statutory interpre-
tations, and desirable probate policy.
The drafters' comment to section 6-201 of the U.P.C. 15 notes that
the U.P.C. will substitute provision operates only on valid inter vivos
transfers. Commentators agree that because of the testamentary
109. In re Estate of O'Brien, 46 Wash. App. 860, 862, 733 P.2d 235, 236 (1987), rev'd 109
Wash. 2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988).
110. Id.
111. See Johnson v. Wheeler, 41 Wash. 2d 246, 247, 248 P.2d 558, 560 (1952).
112. In re Estate of O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 916, 749 P.2d 154, 156 (1988).
113. Id. at 917, 749 P.2d at 157.
114. M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, supra note 67, at 351.
115. The comment following U.P.C. section 6-201 states "The sole purpose of this section is
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features of will substitutes," 6 the section's sole purpose is to prevent
testamentary characterization of such effective transfers containing
provisions effective at death. 11
7
Legislative history of the Washington will substitute statute is lim-
ited." It is unlikely, however, that the legislature would adopt
U.P.C. section 6-201 nearly verbatim119 without intending an applica-
tion similar to that expressed in the official U.P.C. comments. Wash-
ington commentators agree, noting that the legislature intended to
clarify laws validating and invalidating various inter vivos transactions
that "because of certain arguably testamentary features, constitute an
unnecessary source of uncertainty and litigation."' 2
Inequitable outcomes in cases prior to various states' enacting will
substitute statutes further clarify the statutory purpose. Courts used
to consider present transfers of future interests testamentary in nature
and required them to meet will formalities.12" ' In one early Washing-
ton case, Young v. O'Donnell, 122 the supreme court considered a deed
given by a father to his son in exchange for the son's promise to care
for his father until death. The court held that the deed was an invalid
testamentary disposition because the father retained 'a life estate, with
the ability to use and control the property until death.'2 ' Arguments
failed to persuade the court that the father had delivered a future
interest to his son.' 24 Had a will substitute statute been in effect when
Young was decided, the deed presumably would have been valid. Such
inequitable results probably led to the enactment of will substitute
statutes in Washington and other states.
Examining how other states interpret their U.P.C.-patterned stat-
utes also indicates that will substitute statutes apply only to those
116. Supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text (describing testamentary features of will
substitutes).
117. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 922-23, 749 P.2d at 159-60 (Dore, J., dissenting); U.P.C. § 6-
201 comment (1987); M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, supra note 67, at 352.
118. Note, supra note 65, at 453.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 62 & 64 (similarity of Washington Revised Code
§ 11.02.090 and U.P.C. § 6-201).
120. M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, supra note 67, at 352.
121. See Wilhoit v. People's Life Ins. Co., 218 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1955) (decedent's
irrevocable contract with insurance company to hold funds for her and upon her death to pay
those funds to her brother was an invalid testamentary disposition); McCarthy v. Pieret, 281
N.Y. 407, 24 N.E. 2d 102 (1939) (invalid testamentary disposition where mortgage provided that
at holder's death, future installments were to be paid to a third party.xIn re McCoy's Estate, 189
Wash. 103, 63 P.2d 522 (1937) (no valid gift of stock to grantor's children because children never
had possession of the stock certificates).
122. 129 Wash. 219, 224 P. 682 (1924).
123. Id at 224, 224 P. at 684.
124. Id
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conveyances which would be valid except for the will statute. 125 In
First National Bank v. Bloom, 126 the Supreme Court of North Dakota
held there was no constructive delivery of a deed by an uncle to his
nephew where the uncle kept the deed, paid taxes on the land until he
died, and kept a life estate in the property.1 27 Because the deed was
found ineffective as a conveyance, the court held the will substitute
statute128 inapplicable. 129 Six of the fourteen other jurisdictions with
U.P.C.-patterned statutes have reported decisions involving will sub-
stitute cases; all suggest the prevalent view that these statutes only
apply to already effective transfers.130 The O'Brien court is the only
one to depart from this theory and hold that the statute applies to
ineffective deeds.
The Supreme Court of Washington claimed to interpret the statu-
tory language through a strict reading;31 however, an equally strict
and more credible reading of the statute132 indicates that it should
operate only upon otherwise effective inter vivos transfers. The court
reasoned that the phrase "effective as" 133 indicated that "other written
instruments" are the only ones which already must be effective."3
The consensus of commentators and other jurisdictions, however, is
that the phrase does not modify a separate category.1 35 Instead, the
phrase indicates that if a form of effective written contract, gift, con-
veyance, or trust does not fall under one of the eleven specific transfers
125. See, e.g., Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978) (based on
Utah's will substitute statute, life insurance proceeds were nontestamentary in nature, but
delivery requirements were not met by note found in decedent's wallet, indicating he wanted to
change his life insurance policy beneficiary because all policy changes must be mailed to the
insurer or given to third party).
126. 264 N.W.2d 208 (N.D. 1978).
127. Id. at 210-12.
128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-31-14 (1976).
129. First Nat'l Bank 264 N.W.2d at 212.
130. See, e.g., Valenzuela v. Anchonda, 22 Ariz. App. 332, 527 P.2d 109 (1974). In
Valenzuela, the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld as a valid nontestamentary gift a contract
stipulating that any remaining debt on a land purchase contract be terminated at the seller's
death, although the gift would take practical effect only at the seller's death. The Arizona will
substitute statute removed the conveyance from the will statute requirements because a future
interest in the contract rights was delivered.
131. In re Estate of O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 918, 749 P.2d 154, 157 (1988) ("We are to
construe a statute in such a manner as to avoid rendering meaningless a word or portion
thereof.").
132. See supra text accompanying note 61 (quoting language of statute).
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.090 (1987); see also supra text accompanying note 61 for text
of statute.
134. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d. at 917-18, 749 P.2d at 157.
135. Supra notes 120 & 126-32 and accompanying text (interpretation of will substitute
statutes).
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listed, it is still covered by the statute.136 Under this reading, the stat-
ute should not itself validate invalid deeds 137 such as those in
O'Brien. 1
38
The Washington will substitute statute and its U.P.C. counterpart
are complex and confusing,139 but both the prevalent case law and
commentators agree that will substitute statutes operate only on
already effective conveyances. 14° Due to broad language in both pro-
visions,14 1 statutory application may be virtually limitless142 if the
Supreme Court of Washington continues to interpret the statute as it
did in O'Brien. By extending the statute's scope to transfers effective
only at the grantor's death, the O'Brien interpretation may open a
floodgate of testamentary controversies.
143
C. Implications of O'Brien
The O'Brien court's reformation of probate law emphasizes reduc-
ing the need for formalities in order to distribute property according to
the decedent's intent."44 The court accomplishes this at the expense of
the predictability inherent in the formalization of wills. 145 While an
attempt to effect a decedent's testamentary intent can provide just
results, 6 eliminating the requirement of delivery of some interest dur-
ing the grantor's life defeats the very essence of inter vivos transfers.
The court unwisely sacrifices a key element of inter vivos property
136. See In re Estate of O'Brien, 46 Wash. App. 860, 733 P.2d 235 (1987), rev'd, 109 Wash.
2d 913, 749 P.2d 154 (1988).
137. M. RIEUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, supra note 67, at 351.
138. In re Estate of O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 919, 749 P.2d 154, 158 (1988).
139. See M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, supra note 67, at 351; see also R. WRIGHT,
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL § 15.12 (1972) (describing U.P.C. section 6-201
as "broadly worded").
140. Supra notes 115-39 and accompanying text (inapplicability of the will substitute statute
to ineffective deeds).
141. Washington's will substitute statute covers several different provisions, all failing under
the broad categories of contracts, gifts, conveyances, and trusts. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.02.090(1) (1987); see also R. WRIGHT, supra note 139, § 15.12.
142. See M. REUTLINGER & W. OLamAN, supra note 67, at 351.
143. The very concept of an effective will substitute is confusing and "has created a great fault
line across the body of the American law of conveyancing, with continual disturbances across the
line, which have produced cries from outraged commentators, not to speak of the unpublished
cries of disappointed donees." Browder, supra note 23, at 845.
144. In re Estate of O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d 913, 919, 749 P.2d 154, 158 (1988).
145. 1 W. BowE & D. PARKER, supra note 31, §§ 1.6-1.7.
146. Compare O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 919, 749 P.2d at 157-58 with Cook v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 428 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. CL App. 1981). In Cook, the decedent's former wife was
named beneficiary on his life insurance policy, yet he later bequeathed the policy proceeds to his




transfer to accommodate testamentary intent concerns. Continued
judicial insistence that intent suffices for delivery147 could extend to
validate holographic wills.'48 A further extension could permit any
instrument with expressed testamentary intent, such as a signed, type-
written document, to be admitted into probate. 49
After O'Brien, litigants will be unable to predict outcomes in situa-
tions where a testator's valid will devises property to one individual,
and yet other instruments, similar to the O'Brien deeds and not in
compliance with the will statute, purport to convey the same property
to a different individual when the testator dies. Conventional probate
law would allow the will to prevail as an effective testamentary dispo-
sition; the second instrument would fail as an invalid inter vivos trans-
fer attempt. Yet, under O'Brien, both parties have a colorable claim.
The predictability provided by conventional law serves valuable pur-
poses, including making both estate planning and probate easier.'
Conflicts based on O'Brien will further confuse, not clarify, probate
expectations and disputes. Absent clarification of the will substitute
statute and the court's compression of testamentary intent into the
legal delivery requirement, uncertainties and litigation'" will
develop.' 52 The court and the legislature should clarify these
interpretations.
147. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 919, 749 P.2d at 157-58.
148. Holographic wills are unwitnessed, handwritten, and signed by the testator. They are
not given legal effect in Washington. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (1987).
149. See M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, supra note 67, at 351; see also Zartman, An Illinois
Critique of the Uniform Probate Code, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 413, 463 (referring to U.P.C. section 6-
201). A similar result could be found involving life insurance policies, if the insured intended to
change beneficiaries but did not comply with all the contract formalities. Although life insurance
policies differ from deeds in that the former are contractual in nature, both ultimately operate to
create a gratuitous transfer to a beneficiary. A court could extend the O'Brien reasoning to this
conveyance of policy proceeds. Washington is one of several states which give limited effect to an
insured's proven intent that the proceeds pass to someone other than the policy-named
beneficiary, but only when the insured substantially complies with the policy provisions.
Although this test is difficult, see e.g., Allen v. Abrahamson, 12 Wash. App. 103, 529 P.2d 469
(1974), after O'Brien, the substantial compliance requirement could be eliminated and the
contractual relationship seriously weakened.
150. 1 W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 31, §§ 1.6-1.7.
151. The legislature enacted the statute to eliminate the uncertainty and litigation that arose
concerning inter vivos agreements which contained provisions intended to take effect at death.
O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 923, 749 P.2d at 159 (Dore, J., dissenting).
152. See Note, supra note 65, at 469.
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D. Remedying O'Brien
If the O'Brien court only sought a result-oriented decision 153 to give
Peaches Robinson the deeds, it was unnecessary for the court to
address whether intent by itself satisfied the delivery requirement. The
court simply could have applied its expansive interpretation of the will
substitute statute to the deeds. But by finding that intent to pass title
at death qualifies as inter vivos delivery, the court established prece-
dent in opposition to orthodox property theory. Interest in requiring
delivery in inter vivos conveyances, as well as in the predictability
afforded by the will statute, mandates judicial and legislative clarifica-




A judicial solution will most effectively deal with O'Brien's holding
that intent to pass title at death satisfies the delivery requirement. Any
solution must preserve the distinction between inter vivos and testa-
mentary dispositions of property. 55
The court could remedy the statute applicability issue either by
overruling O'Brien, or limiting the holding to its facts. Realistically,
the court is unlikely to admit that its "statutory construction analysis
misses the mark"' 56 and that the statute only applies to already effec-
tive inter vivos transfers. Limiting O'Brien to its facts may not be a
practical solution because Washington courts and other states consist-
ently indicate that cases concerning attempted will substitutes involve
unique fact patterns critical to the disposition of each case. 157 While
limiting the case to its facts leaves open the judicial door for a return
to conventional property law, O'Brien could still provide precedent in
similar will substitute cases where litigants dispute delivery.158 A judi-
cial limitation of O'Brien can only be a short-term bandage for what
could become a long-term probate problem.
153. W. McGOVERN, S. KuRTZ & J. REIN, supra note 91, at 184; see also Bowder, supra note
23, at 846.
154. See supra note 63 (listing states with statutes similar to U.P.C. section 6-201); see also
supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (how courts in these states have considered cases
involving their respective statutes).
155. O'Brien, 109 Wash. 2d at 921, 749 P.2d at 158 (Dore, J., dissenting).
156. Id , 749 P.2d at 159.
157. Supra note 40; see also Annotation, supra note 27.
158. The majority acknowledged the importance of the fact pattern to the case, O'Brien, 109





The best resolution of the will substitute statute problem would
come from the state legislature. The legislature could clarify the stat-
ute by amending it to read:
(1) Any of the following provisions in an otherwise effective contract,
gift, conveyance, or trust is deemed to be nontestamentary, and this title
does not invalidate the instrument or any provision: 159
The eleven specifically named contracts, gifts, conveyances, or trusts
currently enumerated in this section could be listed in a new
subsection:
(4) This section is applicable, but not limited, to otherwise effective
insurance policies, contracts of employment, bonds, mortgages, promis-
sory notes, deposit agreements, pension plans, joint tenancies, commu-
nity property agreements, trust agreements, and conveyances.
This amendment would clarify the intended meaning of the statute
by indicating that the nontestamentary provision exists only for those
transfers which would be effective absent the will statute. 160 As to the
conveyance of deeds, the amendment would indicate clearly that the
statute operates only on those deeds effective because they had already
met the mandatory delivery and intent requirements. This is what
Washington's will substitute statute, modeled on U.P.C. section 6-201,
is designed to accomplish.' 61 By adding additional wording to the
statute, the legislature could make this meaning more apparent.
III. CONCLUSION
Whether or not Mary O'Brien's true intent was realized (and we can
assume protracted litigation was not part of her plan), the O'Brien
holding goes far beyond what was needed to resolve the dispute. The
scope of Washington's will substitute statute now extends beyond the
inter vivos instruments intended by the legislature and has the poten-
tial to eradicate the requirement for testamentary formalities. The
immediate casualties are the predictability of wills and the elimination
of guesswork over the will substitute statute. Moreover, the O'Brien
holding apparently eliminates the requirement for present delivery,
which is the fundamental difference between inter vivos and testamen-
tary transfers. Without preservation and promotion of this difference,
the validity of many contracts, gifts, conveyances, trusts, and wills
159. Emphasis added for purposes of this Note only.
160. U.P.C. § 6-201 comment (1987); M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, supra note 67.
161. U.P.C. § 6-201 comment (1987); M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, supra note 67.
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may be in doubt. The Supreme Court of Washington and the legisla-
ture must clarify the status of the will substitute statute and the deliv-
ery requirement. This is important not just for probate practitioners
and scholars, but also for those who have property and those who
could receive it. Unless the court and the legislature act, O'Brien and
the will substitute statute will continue to spark controversy and
confusion.
Susan Tracey Stearns
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